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Executive Summary  
Since their inception in 1991, charter schools have become a widely-adopted school 
choice policy intended to increase educational outcomes through competition and innovation. 
The details of how states structure their charter school laws are diverse across states, which 
raises the question of whether certain law parameters are better than others at attracting and 
maintaining high-quality charter schools. 
Charter schools are designed around the basis of market accountability; they must attract 
students in order to remain in operation. The threat of closure is an incentive built into the charter 
model that is intended to increase school performance. For this reason, I define charter school 
success across states in terms of charter school closures, with the understanding that the closure 
rate should not be zero (indicating a lack of enforcement) but it should also not be too high 
(indicating poor authorizing practices).  
Charter school advocates have strong beliefs about which law parameters are most 
conducive to the health of a state’s charter environment. I chose two law components that are 
recommended by two prominent advocacy groups and examined their effect on state charter 
school closures. Contrary to the claims of the interest groups, I did not find that these parameters 
impacted charter school closings.   
Through a series of case studies, I further examined the advocacy groups’ policy 
preferences by comparing their state charter school law ranking systems.  The findings of this 
project demonstrate that state policymakers are being pulled in different directions over policies 
that may actually have no real impact on charter school outcomes.  
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Introduction 
In 2017, Kentucky became the forty-fourth state to pass legislation authorizing the 
creation of charter schools. Charter schools are publicly funded schools that are operated by non-
governmental entities. The US Department of Education’s National Charter School Resource 
Center defines these schools as “public schools operating under a ‘charter,’ essentially a contract 
entered into between the school and its authorizing agency.” Each school’s contract establishes 
the conditions and timeframe of their funding from the state and frees them from many of the 
regulations that govern traditional public schools. Unlike traditional public schools (TPS), 
charter schools do not have designated geographic area from which their student population is 
mandated. Instead, charter school students and their families must actively choose for the student 
to attend the school.  
Minnesota was the first state to adopt a charter school law in 1991, and since then states 
have varied greatly in their law design (National Conference of State Legislators 2012).  Some of 
the law parameters include the amount of freedom given to charter schools, the funding 
structures, limits on numbers or types of allowed charters, and the process by which charter 
schools are opened and monitored. Charter schools are a widely adopted policy option intended 
to expand the education marketplace by increasing innovation and competition, thus helping 
families to better match with their educational preferences. Because there is diversity among the 
details of charter school laws across states, it is important to evaluate how various law 
components impact each state’s ability to achieve that policy goal. My research question is as 
follows: What is the relationship, if any, between a state’s charter school law and its charter 
school closures?  
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The statewide charter closure rate is a good indicator of the success of charter schools 
overall within each state. Charter schools are designed around the concept of market 
accountability. Therefore, the closure rate indicates the ability of the state to attract charter 
schools that meet market demand. School closures have negative consequences for affected 
students and the success of the charter movement as a whole. From this perspective, a high 
charter school closure rate is an undesirable policy outcome. However, there is an 
acknowledgement that a rate of zero is not necessarily a good outcome either. If states are 
unwilling to enforce the closure mechanisms of their charter school law, they diminish 
accountability for those schools. For this reason, my analysis also accounts for whether or not a 
state closed any charter schools in a given year. A state’s law parameters establish the 
environment in which charter schools operate, and thus should theoretically influence both the 
presence of closures and the closure rate. By examining the effects of law components on charter 
school closures, I will add to the conversation about the influence of a state’s charter policies on 
school success.  
Literature Review  
 
There is a growing body of research on how charter schools perform in educating 
children. Across the board, charter schools produce mixed results in terms of student outcomes 
on standardized tests (Zimmer et al. 2011). There are inherent challenges to evaluating the 
performance of charter schools as compared to their traditional public school counterparts 
because charters may attract a nonrandom group of students (Zimmer et al. 2009). The market 
conditions under which charter schools operate mean that they must differentiate themselves 
from other educational options in order to be competitive. Many charter schools find an 
educational niche, which may be anything from classical education to the education of students 
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who have dropped out of traditional public schools (Epple et al. 2015). This complicates the 
measurement of their success, because some charter schools may perform better or worse than 
their neighboring TPS solely based on their intended student population. 
However, the self-sorting of students into schools based on their preferences is not 
necessarily a bad thing. Evaluating schools on the basis of academic achievement assumes that 
all families have the same goals of education, and that progress towards those goals is adequately 
captured by standardized test results. This may sound like a big assumption, but research has 
found that standardized test scores do serve as a good predictor of future financial outcomes 
along with larger economic and civic outcomes, holding all else equal (Hanushek 2006, Dee 
2004). Despite these correlations, some parents and students may have educational goals that 
vary from the skills captured in math and reading test scores. The presence of charter schools on 
the education marketplace may allow families to find schools that better match their preferences.  
There is evidence to suggest that some of the value that charter schools provide their 
students may not be evident when examining test results alone. When looking at longer-term 
student outcomes, such as graduation rates, college admission and persistence rates, and early-
career earnings, one study of Florida students found those that attended a charter high school 
were more successful in all these measures on average (Sass et al. 2016).  The study attempted to 
control for inherent selection bias by using a population of students that had all attended a charter 
school in eighth grade; the treatment group attended high school at a charter school, and the 
control group chose a traditional public school for high school. The findings of this study suggest 
that some charter schools may be better at instilling characteristics in their students that will help 
them to succeed in college or the workplace, such as resilience and work ethic, even if those 
characteristics do not translate directly into better test scores during their time in K-12 schools. 
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These results imply that research on charter schools as a policy option may need to expand its 
definition of success to include non-test score factors. My study attempts to do this by relying on 
a market-based measure of success, which represents how well charter schools within each state 
are able to match the population’s education preferences.   
Charter schools, like other school choice policy tools, are theoretically most impactful in 
increasing statewide education quality when they are able to induce positive competitive effects 
on traditional public schools. Advocates for the privatization of the education marketplace 
suggest that schools will perform at maximum capacity only when they are forced to compete for 
students (Friedman 1962). This is based on the assumption that the market force of competition 
will create incentives for schools to increase productive efficiency. Evidence has been mixed 
regarding the presence and magnitude of the competitive effect of charter schools in the 
education market. One notable study found that more choices within districts led to lower 
spending and improved educational attainment, wages, and standardized test scores (Hoxby 
2000). A review of the research on the topic found “reasonably consistent” evidence that higher 
levels of competition led to increased educational outcomes, although the increase effect size 
was determined to be modest (Belfield and Levine 2002). Reviews of the existing literature have 
found mostly neutral or modest positive competitive effects (Epple et al. 2015, Gill 2016).  
By increasing competition, charter schools allow people to better match their preferences 
and may have positive influences on traditional public school performance. State-level data on 
charter school closure rates should theoretically capture the market-based nature of charter 
school success. If states believe that a low charter school closure rate is a desirable outcome, they 
will want to create an environment that encourages that through their policy choices. I did not 
find studies in the literature that have linked the school closure rate per state to state law 
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components, as I have done in this analysis. However, several studies have evaluated the effect 
that various state law components have on school openings or student achievement, as discussed 
below.  
In their 2006 study, Shober et al. evaluated the structure of charter school laws along two 
value dimensions: flexibility and accountability. They first examined the conditions that may 
influence a state’s balance between those two factors, such as political and demographic makeup. 
In that area, they found that charters were more likely to open in states with higher minority 
populations and larger state populations (p. 580). Also, charter law revisions were likely to favor 
school operators more than the original law. Shober et al. point out that original charter laws 
were often structured to increase accountability in exchange for increased flexibility. The 
revisions, they found, granted more flexibility but also decreased accountability. The authors 
attributed this shift to the influence of interest groups and partisan factors (p. 581). Next, the 
authors examined the effect of various flexibility and accountability law components on charter 
school openings. Application and authorization design was found to be very influential on the 
state’s number of charter openings. Unlike this previous study, I am interested the quality of the 
attracted schools, as defined by their market success, instead of just the quantity of schools 
entering the state. However, the opening rates used by this previous study and the closure rate 
used in my design are related due to the role of authorizers in both processes.  
In her overview of charter school authorizers, Sandra Vergari (2001) discusses the three 
primary roles of authorizers. First, they must enter into charter agreements with potential 
schools. Essentially, groups or corporations that want to open a charter school within the state 
must present their case to an authorizing body, which either grants a charter contract or refuses to 
do so. A school’s charter outlines the conditions of its operation, including performance 
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standards, managerial requirements, and the duration of the contract. Second, authorizers are 
responsible for monitoring charter schools and their boards of directors for compliance with the 
conditions of the charter. Noncompliance may warrant intervention by the authorizers, which can 
include sanctions or even school closure. Finally, authorizers are responsible for the renewal or 
revocation of charters at the conclusion of the designated charter timeframe.   
Research has been done on the effect of authorizers on student achievement. A 2013 
study by Zimmer et al. (2013) examined the effects of school authorizer type on student test 
score gains in a single-state analysis of Ohio. Ohio has four types of authorizers: districts, 
educational service centers, nonprofit organizations, and the state. That study found that students 
in schools authorized by nonprofit organizations have lower achievement gains in reading and 
math than students in other charter schools. In their discussion of these results, Zimmer et al. 
observe that the direction of the relationship between the authorizer and the schools is not clear. 
It could be that weaker schools are attracted to nonprofits as their authorizers; another possibility 
is that nonprofit organization have less ability to provide adequate oversight and accountability. 
A similar study conducted in 2011 by Carlson et al. also examined the effect of charter 
school authorizers on student achievement. This research was conducted in Minnesota, which 
joins Ohio as one of the four states that allow nonprofit organizations to authorize charter 
schools. The authors of this study found that there was no statistically significant relationship 
between authorizer type and student achievement, although nonprofits were found to have the 
most within-type variation in performance.  
Each state’s charter school law parameters are only a piece of the puzzle when it comes 
to school success. However, there does seem to be an opportunity for research in this area when 
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it comes to comparing law structures across states. The examination of these trends could lead to 
the isolation of certain policy structures that foster good school design. 
Methods  
 
Background  
A majority of US states now have a charter school law, and some states have had charter 
schools for over 25 years. Each state’s ability to attract and maintain high-quality charter schools 
may be influenced by the parameters of its charter school law. Two prominent education groups 
release annual scorecards ranking each state’s charter law in comparison to their determined 
“best practices.” The first is the Center for Education Reform (CER), an advocacy group that 
places heavy emphasis on free market principles. Its scorecard has been released annually since 
1996 and currently consists of 10 criteria which all favor school autonomy (Center for Education 
Reform 2017). This scorecard is grounded in theory, which can be a strength and a weakness. It 
does not list evidence that their model actually produces good school outcomes; however, less 
regulations may allow schools to be flexible in meeting market demands, which is the basis of 
accountability for charter schools. A second group, the National Alliance for Public Charter 
Schools (NAPCS), also releases an annual charter law scorecard. They compare states to their 
model law, which emphasizes growth of high-performing schools and accountability for low-
performing schools (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools 2017). NAPCS released its 
original model law in 2009 and updated it in 2016. The law is based on their analysis of state 
charter school experiences and research. This model is much more systematic and detailed than 
its CER counterpart; the NAPCS scorecard has 21 law components that each have multiple 
subcomponents.   
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Research Question 
The two scorecards can be helpful in providing frameworks for state policymakers to 
think about the merits of their law structure. By establishing best practices, these organizations 
attempt to set the path for states seeking to improve their charter environment. However, neither 
of these organizations provide empirical evidence linking better charter school outcomes with 
their preferred law components. There is some consensus between the groups on certain policy 
choices; however, there are also conflicting elements of the two scorecards (See Appendix A for 
full comparison). My analysis will contribute to this discussion by comparing state-level charter 
school performance data to components of each state’s law structure. My research question is as 
follows: What is the relationship, if any, between a state’s charter school law and its charter 
school closures?  
Unit of analysis  
The state-level analysis of my model is an important research decision. As previously 
noted, my research design is unique in the literature because it is comparing policy outcomes 
across states, which could be helpful in crafting or modifying charter school legislation.   
Research focused on academic achievement is generally limited to looking for differences 
between charter schools and traditional public schools within a single state. Previous studies that 
have done analysis on law component effects have also been limited to within-state, school level 
analysis. If done well, this provides a high degree of internal validity because all the schools in 
the analyses would be operating under the same conditions, allowing the researchers to better 
isolate the effects of the policy. However, they may have limited external validity; a policy that 
is effective in one state may not accomplish its goals in another.  
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Dependent Variable – Charter School Closures 
 My dependent variables are measures of charter school closures over time. Charter 
schools are designed to have to prove their merit in a market environment. The threat of closure 
is an incentive designed to hold charter schools accountable to high performance standards 
(Vergari 2001). With that in mind, school closures are not necessarily a “bad” thing. If charter 
schools could not fail, the basis of their accountability would be compromised. The movement of 
students from a low-quality school to a higher quality school is undoubtedly a good thing. When 
it comes to policy implications, I will not suggest that the presence of school closures indicate a 
failure in law design. For that reason, my first dependent variable is a simple dummy variable of 
whether or not a state with charter schools closed any of them in a given year.  
However, a high statewide closure rate indicates that the details of the state’s charter 
policies may need to be reevaluated. A high percentage of school closures can have negative 
direct and indirect effects on statewide education quality. Students who attended the closed 
school may be negatively affected by having to switch schools, sometimes in the middle of the 
academic year. The students attending nearby traditional public schools may also be negatively 
affected by an influx of displaced students, which can be disruptive or cause issues of 
overcrowding. On a broader scale, charter school closures can be detrimental to public 
perception of charter schools as a whole, which could weaken public support of charters as well 
as other school choice policies.  Theoretically, an optimal charter school closure rate would be 
greater than zero percent but not too high as to indicate the over-authorization of ill-equipped 
schools.  
I acknowledge that using school closures means that my analysis is looking only at 
extreme cases of failure. By classifying schools into “winners” which remained open and 
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“losers” which were closed, my model neglects the very diverse performance of charter schools 
across the nation that remain open. It is probable that there are poor-performing charter schools 
across the country that, for whatever reason, are staying open. There is potential that these 
schools could bias my analysis in favor of states with particularly lenient standards for 
performance-based closure. The validity of the state charter school closure rate as my dependent 
variable relies heavily on market accountability. Every charter school, regardless of performance, 
is open because it attracts an adequate number of students to remain in operation. My research 
question is not focusing on the performance of charters, but rather on the performance of the 
state’s charter law in its ability to foster an environment for successful schools, where success is 
defined by their ability to meet market demands.  
This framework is complicated by the fact that charter schools sometimes close despite 
their market enrollment success due to other breaches of their charter, such as financial 
mismanagement. This can be reconciled with my market accountability perspective by viewing 
the situation as a principal-agent relationship. In a market accountability model, families are the 
principals and schools are the agents in the education exchange. The basis of the principal-agent 
problem is that an information asymmetry exists between the two parties (Pratt and Zechhauser 
1985). One way that the principal can remedy this is through monitoring mechanisms. In this 
situation, charter school authorizers – or other entities responsible for the closure of schools – 
serve as a monitoring mechanism. The closure rate captures the true preferences of the market 
because if an authorizer closes a school for financial mismanagement, it is acting on behalf of the 
preferences of the families. This rests on the assumption that if families had better information 
about the practices of those mismanaged schools, they would not have chosen them.  
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Independent Variables – Charter Law Components  
One element of a state’s charter school law is its creation of charter school authorizing 
entities. Authorizers are responsible for overseeing charter schools and their boards of directors. 
Some states have multiple types of authorizers while others only have one. I am interested in 
how the type and number of types of authorizers affect the charter landscape for that state. As 
previously noted, states with high charter school closure rates may have a problem with their 
authorization process being too lenient. My hypothesis is that a higher number of authorizer 
types will lead to a higher charter school closure rate. A variety of authorizer types could lead to 
schools “shopping around” until they were able to find a willing authorizer, regardless of flaws 
in their school proposal. This component has implications because there are significant barriers 
that authorizers face in closing schools, so it is generally better for authorizers to have a rigorous 
application process than to have to close failing schools (Vergari 2001). Both advocacy 
organizations agree that states should have multiple types of authorizers.   
My data on authorizers is from 1995 to 2013 and includes the six types of authorizers as 
categorized by the National Association of Charter School Authorizers (2018): higher education 
institution (HEI), independent charter board (ICB), local education agency (LEA), non-
educational government entity (NEG), not-for-profit organization (NFP), and state education 
agency (SEA). My primary model examines the effect of the number of types of authorizers on 
charter school closures. I also conducted some basic analysis to examine the relationships 
between the specific types of authorizers.  
The organizations that produce annual scorecards also agree that state laws should not 
cap the number of charter schools that are permitted. I am including the presence of a charter cap 
in my analysis because it may have an effect on the school closure rate. If a state has a school 
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cap, its closure rate is likely to be low once the state is at capacity. Artificially suppressing the 
market through a cap may limit the closure rate, but this is not necessarily a policy success if 
there is demand in the market that is not being met. This is a policy option that some states 
initially adopted but have since abolished; those states could provide insight into the effect of 
removing a cap. NAPCS has been collecting this data on an annual basis since the beginning of 
its model law report cards in 2010. The Education Commission of the States has collected this 
data since 1996 but not on an annual basis. Using these data sources along with original research, 
I complied data on charter cap policies for all the years present in my analysis.  
Control Variables 
 There are several additional factors that may also influence a state’s charter school 
closures besides its charter school law structure. The amount of time that a state has had charter 
schools could affect the closure rate as the market simply leveled out over time. For example, a 
state’s first few years after charter adoption could be characterized by various charters trying to 
find their place in the market, with some succeeding and others failing. Once a state has had 
charter schools for a significant time, some of that turmoil may have subsided, making its closure 
rate lower than a recent adopter who is still in the trial period. For this reason, my model controls 
the number of years since charter law adoption Additionally, I conducted a sensitivity analysis 
including only states that have had their charter school laws for more than five years.  
 My model also includes the Fording revised 1960-2013 citizen ideology series as a 
control (Berry et al. 1998). Charter schools are not necessarily a clear-cut partisan policy option; 
they have historically had support and opposition from both sides of the aisle. However, state 
ideology serves as a good indicator for other policies that could influence charter schools. In 
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particular, ideology is highly correlated with a state’s right to work policies, which could 
influence charter school success due to the historical strength of unions within public education.  
 A related variable that could also influence charter market success in a given state is the 
quality of each state’s traditional public schools. To control for this, I have included statewide 
average scores on the National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP) for 8th grade math. 
This variable was not available for every year in my model, so I assumed that changes are linear 
and constant between observed values in order to generate missing year data. Each state has its 
share of high-quality and low-quality schools. This variable does not capture within-state 
differences in TPS quality, but it is helpful in teasing out the quality of the education 
marketplace in which charters are competing across states.  
 Another variable that could influence charter school closure rates from state to state is the 
amount of funding that charter schools receive in comparison to traditional public schools. One 
comparative variable would be the amount of funding charter schools receive per dollar spent on 
traditional public schools in each state. This controls for the relative disadvantage that charter 
schools face in educating their students. I was able to find data for the years 2003, 2007, and 
2011 for a maximum of 31 states from reports done by the University of Arkansas and Ball State 
University. Again, I estimated the missing years within that timeframe on the assumption that 
changes are linear and constant between observed values over time. Those studies weighted the 
statewide TPS district funding amount to account for differences in charter school concentration 
in urban areas across states. I used their numbers for weighted district per pupil funding and 
charter school per pupil funding to generate a variable that conveys the amount charter schools 
received per dollar received by traditional public schools. 
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Model Design 
 My data consists of state-level data from the period of 1991 to 2013. My goal is to isolate 
the effects of my specified law components on each state’s charter school closures over time. For 
this reason, I will use an OLS regression model on panel data with a state fixed effect estimation. 
 Some states in my model have had charter schools for 26 years. States that adopted their 
charter school law since 2013 are not included within my model. Additionally, states were not 
included in years during which they had no open charter schools. Once I applied these 
parameters, I had a total of 629 observations on 40 states plus the District of Columbia across a 
maximum of 23 years. Due to limited data availability for my funding control, I ran multiple 
versions of my model to include and exclude this variable. This was a trade-off between sample 
size – both in number of observations and number of included states – and controlling for what is 
likely an influential factor. I also conducted a second set of analyses looking only at states that 
had their charter schools for five years or more.  
 My model includes a fixed effects estimator to control for time invariant characteristics 
of each state over time. This is necessary because each state has a unique set of laws and culture, 
which are unmeasurable but still need to be accounted for in my model.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics  
 Although there is no established standard of what a state’s charter school closure rate 
should be, it can be helpful to compare each state to the national average. Interestingly, my data 
had no recorded charter school closings until 1998, which is six years after the first charter 
schools opened. To put this in perspective, there were 18 states with open charter schools in 
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1997, the previous year. Some states had only one open charter that year, but some had as many 
as 62 in Michigan or 87 in California.  
 
Figure 1: National Average of State Charter School Closure Rates, 1991-2013 
 
 As shown in Figure 2, the percent of states with charter schools that close any schools 
within a given year has dramatically increased over time. Despite this overall trend, there were 8 
states that had never closed a charter school as of 2013.  
Number of Authorizer Types 
As previously discussed, there are six types of authorizers, which include local education 
agencies, state education agencies, higher education institutions, not-for-profits, non-education 
governmental entities, and independent charter boards. LEAs are the most popular type of 
authorizer, and having two authorizers is the most popular trend in authorizing types. Figure 3 
shows the number of states with each number of authorizing types by year.  
To better understand the authorizing landscape across states, I first conducted correlation 
tests to see if there were any patterns authorizer composition and how they relate to one another. 
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There is a significant and strong positive correlation between local education agencies (LEA) 
and higher education institutions. On the other hand, state education agencies have a significant 
 
Figure 2: Percent of States with Charter Schools that Closed Any Charters, 1991-2013 
  
negative correlation with higher education institutions, non-education government entities, and 
independent charter boards. These relationships could be due to the power dynamics at play 
between these groups. Because charter school laws are constructed at the state level, states that 
grant authorizing authority to the SEAs may not want to weaken the state’s power by allowing 
for competing authorizers. On the other hand, there is no significant correlation between SEAs 
and LEAs as authorizers. It is possible that this stems from the state not viewing LEAs as 
competition since the state has control over them. Some states structure their authorizing process 
so that charter applications are originally proposed to LEAs, but denied applications can appeal 
to the SEA as a secondary authorizer. This system maintains the state as the ultimate authorizing 
authority.  
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 Models including the funding control were limited in scope to the years of 2003 to 2011. 
During that time, few states changed the number of authorizing types that they had. This resulted 
in my independent variable being engulfed into the state fixed effects estimator. In order to 
isolate the effects of the number of authorizing types, I examined the relationship of that variable 
on the fixed effects estimator itself. This reveals the true relationship between number of 
authorizing types on my original model. 
 
Figure 3: Number of States per Number of Authorizing Types, 1995-2013 
Authorizing 
Types 
‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 
1 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
2 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
4 
        
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
5 
        
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
  The number of authorizing types was not statistically significantly related to the fixed 
effect estimator. However, some categories within the variable had a negative statistically 
significant effect on the school closure rate. States that have two or three types of authorizers are 
less likely to close schools than states with one type or four types (only one state, Louisiana, has 
five types, so that category was dropped from the analysis). This finding was consistent with 
models that did not include the funding control and thus had a larger sample size.  
There are two possible explanations for this trend. The first relates to the perspective of 
states that choose only one authorizer or four authorizers. One authorizing type indicates that the 
state may desire stronger control over charter school openings and closings. This theory is 
supported by the previously discussed negative correlation between SEAs and certain other types 
of authorizers. On the other hand, states that allow four authorizers may create a sense of 
 Byers 20 
competition amongst authorizers. They may be held accountable if they do not close poor-
performing schools by the threat of being a replaceable authorizer. 
 
Figure 4: Regression Results, All States 
Variables 
Any 
Closings  
Any 
Closings  
Closure 
Rate  
Closure 
Rate  
 
Number of Observations 
 
215 
 
604 
 
215 
 
604 
Law Components     
Number of Authorizer Types 
 
--- -.0137 
(.0287) 
--- -.1556 
(.1886) 
Presence of Charter Cap 
 
-.2034 
(.1387) 
-.0238 
(.0780) 
.4933 
(.5581) 
-.6729 
(.8138) 
Controls     
Ideology Scores 
 
-.0069 
(.0043) 
-.0106*** 
(.0027) 
-.0399* 
(.0196) 
-.0550*** 
(.0169) 
NAEP 8th Grade Math Scores 
 
-.0088 
(.0173) 
.0021 
(.0101) 
-.1191* 
(.0693) 
-.1451 
(.1339) 
Law Age 
 
.0887*** 
(.0218) 
.0431*** 
(.0094) 
.3580*** 
(.0861) 
.2299** 
(.0942) 
Funding Control Included  
 
Yes 
.6268 
(.5570) 
No Yes 
1.645 
(1.904) 
No 
*Indicates significance at the 90% confidence level 
** Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level 
*** Indicates significance at the 99% confidence level 
The other explanation is tied to the composition authorizing type. For example, single-
authorizers are exclusively LEAs (17 states), SEAs (5 States), and ICBs (3 states). It could be 
that certain authorizing types are more likely to close schools. If that is the case, those that are 
typically single-authorizers may be more likely to close schools, and having four types may 
mean that you are more likely to include a high-closure type within your authorizing portfolio.  
Charter School Cap  
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 No version of my model found a significant relationship between the presence of a 
charter school cap and state charter school closures. This is an interesting finding because charter 
caps are strongly opposed by many charter school supporters, including both organizations that 
release charter law rankings.   
Duration Variables 
The results of my original analysis showed a significant and positive relationship between 
state charter school closures and the length of time that the state has had its charter school law. 
This suggests that the longer a state has had charter schools, the more likely it is to have school 
closures and the higher its closure rate will be. Although this contradicts my original hypothesis, 
there are several possible factors that could contribute to this relationship. First, it is not 
unreasonable for states to give their first charter schools adequate time to demonstrate their 
performance in one direction or another. So, it may be expected that the first three to five years 
have less closures as states or authorizers allow charter school results to unfold. It could also be 
the case that authorizers are more lenient on schools during the early years of charter adoption 
due to a learning curve on the authorizer’s part. For this reason, I conducted a sensitivity 
analysis, where I ran my models again using only states that had their charter law for five years 
or more.  
This model does not include a funding variable because by 2003, the first year for which 
I have funding data, 40 of the 41 states had adopted their charter law already. Of those, only 6 
states had had their law less than 5 years. It happens to be that my funding variable does not 
contain data for any of those 6 states, meaning any model including my funding variable was 
looking only at veteran states anyway.  
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Figure 5: Regression Results, Veteran States Only 
Variables 
Any 
Closings  
Closure 
Rate  
 
Number of Observations 
 
604 
 
604 
Law Components   
Number of Authorizer Types 
 
.0130 
(.0352) 
-.0090 
(.1256) 
Presence of Charter Cap 
 
-.0773 
(.0727) 
-.9593 
(.8861) 
Controls   
Ideology Scores 
 
-.0104*** 
(.0024) 
-.0539*** 
(.0158) 
NAEP 8th Grade Math Scores 
 
.0440*** 
(.0070) 
.0799 
(.0524) 
Veteran Status  
 
-.0590 
(.0510) 
-.3502 
(.6059) 
*Indicates significance at the 90% confidence level 
** Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level 
*** Indicates significance at the 99% confidence level 
Future research could compare the academic achievement success of early opening 
charter schools with those that open later to see if approval standards become more rigorous over 
time. Public awareness and scrutiny of charter performance may also increase over time, leading 
to more school closures as information becomes available in the education marketplace and 
parents make different decisions about where to send their children. This trend could also be a 
consequence of the time period over which it occurred. There was a huge difference in the 
availability of information between the 1990s and the early 2010s due to technological advances. 
The public in general could be holding charter schools – and perhaps all schools – to a higher 
standard based on easily-accessible information. Another possible explanation for the increase in 
school closings over time could be tied to the market viability of charter schools that open right 
when a law is passed versus those that open later. If a local market has a high demand for a 
certain education preference, that market may attract a charter school soon after the state’s law 
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adoption. Charters that open later may not be as aligned with market demand. This time variable 
may need to be explored more in future research. States who are new adopters or have yet to pass 
charter legislation may benefit from looking to their veteran counterparts for best practices in 
authorizing and monitoring of early schools.  
Control Variables 
Citizen ideology was found to be significant when the model did not control for 
differences in funding across states. Once the relative funding of charter schools was taken into 
account, ideology did not have an effect on whether or not a state closed any schools. However, 
it still did have a modest negative effect on the state’s closure rate. This means that, among states 
that close schools, being more liberal is correlated with a lower school closure rate, all else 
equal. As previously mentioned, one possible explanation could be the increased strength of 
unions in more liberal states. Unions tend to be strongly associated with traditional public 
schools, and may be skeptical of alternative models such as charter schools. If this is the case, 
charter schools that are able to open in those states may be more likely to stay open because they 
were more thoroughly vetted than charter schools in more conservative states without union 
influence.  
 Once accounting for differences in charter school funding, NAEP scores were also found 
to have a negative statistically significant relationship on the school closure rate, with no effect 
on whether or not a state closed any schools. This means that, among states that actually close 
schools, those with higher 8th grade math NAEP scores in traditional public schools have a lower 
charter school closure rate. In my model with only veteran states, NAEP scores were found to 
have a statistically significant and positive relationship on a state’s likelihood of closing any 
schools, with no effect on the actual closure rate. This variable was intended to control for the 
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quality of the traditional public schools against which charter schools in the state have to 
compete. I expected that high-quality traditional public schools would lead to more charter 
school closures because parents would be more willing to move their children to the neighboring 
TPS if the charters do not perform well.  
The negative relationship from my original analysis could be revealing information about 
state ability to attract high quality charter schools, instead of their ability to maintain the ones 
they have. If higher TPS quality is driving up market expectations, charter schools may 
understand that they have to raise their performance in order to be competitive in those markets. 
This could deter certain potential charter schools from opening, leading to a lower closure rate as 
those that actually enter the market are the ones most likely to succeed anyway. This has 
negative policy implications for the effectiveness of charter schools as an alternative to low-
quality traditional public schools. States with poor-performing traditional public schools may be 
more likely to attract low-quality charter schools than states with high-performing traditional 
public schools. This is not good news for parents and students within those states because the 
quality of their educational choices does not necessarily increase.  
There is an alternative possibility that some reverse causality is at play. States with a low 
charter school closure rate have schools that are more successful at meeting market demand. If 
charter schools are having a competitive effect on the state’s traditional public schools, then they 
could be driving the NAEP scores upwards for that state.  
Case Study 
When it comes to charter school law components, there is not a definitive set of best 
practices that will ensure a healthy charter school environment. As previously discussed, there 
are two prominent interest groups that release annual rankings of state laws in comparison to 
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their own model laws: The National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (NAPCS) and the 
Center for Education Reform (CER). In order to see how these two model laws differ in their 
recommendations, I compared how each state ranked on the 2012 version of the reports from 
both organizations. Nineteen states ranked higher on the CER model while twenty states fared 
better on the NAPCS model (See Appendix B for full list). The average state ranking difference 
between the two models was approximately 7 spots, with a median of 5 spots. 
Three states scored exactly the same on both rankings. Minnesota was ranked as the 
second best law in the nation by both systems, behind Maine in the NAPCS system and DC in 
the CER model. Kansas ranked 39th in both models. Interestingly, Mississippi was labeled as the 
worst law by both organizations. Mississippi was not included in my original analysis because it 
did not have any charter schools during the 1991-2013 period of my study. An additional nine 
states (Colorado, Iowa, Oregon, Louisiana, Wyoming, Oklahoma, California, New York, and 
Utah) scored within 2 points of the same ranking on both systems. 
The 12 states that rank within 2 points of each other on both organization’s list suggest 
that there is consensus among the interest groups regarding best practices. In fact, the two 
systems do have some elements in common. They both agree that states should not cap charter 
schools, there should be multiple authorizing entities, and that charter school should be provided 
with equitable operational and facility funding. Other elements of the two scorecards are similar, 
but have a slightly different emphasis, tone, or intention. Some elements of the two scorecards 
seem to be in direct opposition to one another. CER advocates for authorizer independence while 
NAPCS favors the requirement of an authorizer accountability system. Additionally, there are 
some components of each scorecard that the other does not directly consider. The 2017 CER 
scorecard weighs a law’s provision of Pre-K funds, for which there is no NAPCS equivalent. 
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NAPCS has 8 components that do not fit neatly into one of the CER categories. That being said, 
CER’s scorecard has 10 categories that are relatively broad compared to the detailed components 
of the NAPCS system. The matching of components (Appendix A) across the two systems was 
an original assessment based on the descriptions provided by each organization.  
Despite the significant number of states that scored similarly on the two rankings in 2012, 
there are 17 states that had more than a 5-place difference in ranking across the two 
organizations. Notably, that includes four outlying states, the rankings for which varied by 15 
places or more on the two systems. Two of these states were ranked higher by CER; Idaho and 
Wisconsin each ranked 20 places higher on that list than they did on the NAPCS rankings. On 
the other end of the spectrum, New Mexico and Maine ranked 18 and 26 spots higher 
respectively on the NAPCS model than they did on the CER equivalent.  
The states with huge ranking differences would be rightly confused about the quality of 
their charter school law and what improvements could be made to it. In the following sections, I 
will examine each outlier’s rankings and discuss possible reasons for the different judgements of 
the two organizations. 
Idaho 
 Idaho scored 20 places better in the CER model than the NAPCS in 2012. It was ranked 
twelfth on the CER list and thirty-second on the NAPCS list. The largest difference in score 
between the two models was as it relates to CER’s district autonomy component. This is in direct 
opposition to the NAPCS performance-based charter contract requirement, which trades school 
autonomy for more accountability. Thus, it makes sense that Idaho did much better in CER’s 
model for that variable. 
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Figure 6: Idaho Scorecard Comparison 
*CER does not specify point value maximums for these two individual components; they are 
worth a combined 15 points, and I assumed that the operational funding was worth 10 points 
and the facility funding was worth 5 points.  
**Idaho repealed its charter cap in 2012; the CER score reflects this while the NAPCS score 
does not. 
  
  Interestingly, Idaho has several components for which they received a higher percentage 
score on the NAPCS component than the corresponding CER one, despite their overall higher 
ranking from CER. One such category was the area of teacher freedom; however, the CER point 
deduction appears to come solely from charter teachers being forced into the state retirement 
system, meaning CER did not penalize an aspect of their collective bargaining exemption.  
IDAHO  
CER Measure Percent 
Score 
NAPCS Measure Percent 
Score 
Percentage 
Point 
Difference  
Independent/ 
Multiple 
Authorizers 
33% 
 
Multiple Authorizers Available 50% -17 
Authorizer and Overall Program 
Accountability System Required 
0% 33 
Number of 
Schools 
Allowed** 
100% No Caps** 25% 75 
State Autonomy 60% Automatic Exemption from Many State and 
District Law and Regulations (12) 
50% 10 
District 
Autonomy 
  
  
80% 
 
 
Performance-Based Charter Contract 
Required 
0% 80 
Comprehensive Charter School Monitoring 
and Data Collection Processes 
75% 5 
Fiscally and Legally Autonomous Schools, 
with Independent Public Charter School 
Boards 
100% -20 
Teacher 
Freedom 
80% Automatic Collective Bargaining Exemption 100% -20 
Access to Relevant Employee Retirement 
Systems 
50% 30 
100% Funding* 50% Equitable Operational Funding and Equal 
Access to All State and Federal Categorical 
Funding 
50% 0 
Facilities Funds* 0% Equitable Access to Capital Funding and 
Facilities 
25% -25 
Total Score 56% Total Score 44% 12 
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Idaho also scored higher on the NAPCS component of multiple authorizers than the CER 
equivalent. Idaho has two types of authorizers: local school boards and an independent charter 
board. However, the ICB can only authorize virtual schools or schools whose applications were 
previously rejected by an LEA. Both organizations deduct points for this feature, since the ICB is 
severely limited in its authorizing power.  
Wisconsin 
 Like Idaho, Wisconsin also placed 20 points better on the CER ranking than the NAPCS 
one, with rankings of 16 and 36, respectively.  
Figure 7: Wisconsin Scorecard Comparison 
WISCONSIN 
CER Measure Percent 
Score 
NAPCS Measure Percent 
Score 
Percentage 
Point 
Difference  
Independent/ 
Multiple 
Authorizers 
20% 
 
Multiple Authorizers Available 50% -30 
Authorizer and Overall Program 
Accountability System Required 
0% 20 
Number of 
Schools Allowed 
100% No Caps 75% 25 
State Autonomy 100% Automatic Exemption from Many State 
and District Law and Regulations (12) 
50% 50 
District 
Autonomy 
  
  
60% 
 
 
Performance-Based Charter Contract 
Required 
50% 10 
Comprehensive Charter School 
Monitoring and Data Collection 
Processes 
25% 35 
Fiscally and Legally Autonomous 
Schools, with Independent Public Charter 
School Boards 
25% 35 
Teacher Freedom 60% Automatic Collective Bargaining 
Exemption 
50% 10 
Access to Relevant Employee Retirement 
Systems 
25% 35 
100% Funding* 40% Equitable Operational Funding and Equal 
Access to All State and Federal 
Categorical Funding 
25% 15 
Facilities Funds* 0% Equitable Access to Capital Funding and 
Facilities 
25% -25 
Total Score 51% Total Score 33% 18 
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 Wisconsin scored slightly better on the CER model in their charter cap component. 
NAPCS probably withholds points in this category due to Wisconsin’s limit on the number of 
virtual charter students as well as its limit on one of its University authorizers (Education 
Commission of the States 2010). The University of Wisconsin-Parkside can only authorize one 
charter school. CER penalizes the state for this in its category dealing with independent 
authorizers instead of considering it to be a “cap.”  
New Mexico 
 New Mexico was ranked as the fourth-best law by NAPCS, but placed right around the 
middle of the pack at number 22 with the CER report. This is an 18-spot difference between the 
two systems for 2012.   
 New Mexico has two authorizer types – local school boards and the state board of 
education. They receive full credit under the NAPCS model for this; however, on the CER 
equivalent they score a mere 27 percent. CER does not provide an explanation for this deduction 
(page 57).  
 In the area of state autonomy, New Mexico scores higher on the CER component. This is 
due to differences in how the two organizations view the state’s approach to operational 
exemptions. New Mexico does not automatically exempt charter schools from state 
requirements, but instead issues waivers, some of which have to be requested on a case-by-case 
basis. CER seems to believe this gives schools adequate autonomy, while NAPCS does not seem 
to feel the same.  
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Figure 8: New Mexico Scorecard Comparison 
NEW MEXICO 
CER Measure Percent 
Score 
NAPCS Measure Percent 
Score 
Percentage 
Point 
Difference  
Independent/ 
Multiple 
Authorizers 
  
27% 
 
Multiple Authorizers Available 100% 73 
Authorizer and Overall Program 
Accountability System Required 
50% 23 
Number of 
Schools Allowed 
40% No Caps 50% 10 
State Autonomy 80% Automatic Exemption from Many State and 
District Law and Regulations 
25% -55 
District 
Autonomy 
  
  
60% 
 
 
Performance-Based Charter Contract 
Required 
75% 15 
Comprehensive Charter School Monitoring 
and Data Collection Processes 
100% 40 
Fiscally and Legally Autonomous Schools, 
with Independent Public Charter School 
Boards 
100% 40 
Teacher 
Freedom 
80% Automatic Collective Bargaining Exemption 100% 20 
Access to Relevant Employee Retirement 
Systems 
50% -30 
100% Funding* 70% Equitable Operational Funding and Equal 
Access to All State and Federal Categorical 
Funding 
50% -20 
Facilities Funds* 0% Equitable Access to Capital Funding and 
Facilities 
50% 50 
Total Score 47% Total Score 65% 18 
*See note on Figure 6  
Maine 
Maine was the state with the most dramatic difference in rankings. It was considered by 
NAPCS to be the number one charter school law in the country. CER ranked it well below the 
median at twenty-seventh, a 26-spot difference.  
The two scorecards give Maine similar rankings on many of their shared components. 
They each penalize it for its restrictive caps on the number of schools as well as student 
enrollment. They positively score the state’s choice to allow teachers to opt out of collective 
bargaining.  
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Figure 9: Maine Scorecard Comparison 
MAINE 
CER Measure Percent 
Score 
NAPCS Measure Percent 
Score 
Percentage 
Point 
Difference  
Independent/ 
Multiple 
Authorizers 
  
27% 
 
Multiple Authorizers Available 50% 23 
Authorizer and Overall Program 
Accountability System Required 
75% 48 
Number of 
Schools 
Allowed 
30% No Caps 25% 5 
State Autonomy 60% Automatic Exemption from Many State and 
District Law and Regulations (12) 
75% 15 
District 
Autonomy 
  
  
60% 
 
 
Performance-Based Charter Contract 
Required 
100% 40 
Comprehensive Charter School Monitoring 
and Data Collection Processes 
75% 15 
Fiscally and Legally Autonomous Schools, 
with Independent Public Charter School 
Boards 
100% 40 
Teacher 
Freedom 
80% Automatic Collective Bargaining 
Exemption 
75% -5 
Access to Relevant Employee Retirement 
Systems 
100% 20 
100% Funding* 70% Equitable Operational Funding and Equal 
Access to All State and Federal Categorical 
Funding 
100% 30 
Facilities 
Funds* 
0% Equitable Access to Capital Funding and 
Facilities 
25% 25 
Total Score 44% Total Score 76% 32 
*See note on Figure 6  
Despite these similarities, there are large differences in the outcomes of the two ranking 
systems. Most notable is the difference between the authorizing components. Although Maine 
does have two different types of authorizers – LEAs and an Independent Charter Board – CER 
attributes their low score in this area to the state’s lack of an appeal process and the fact that the 
ICB is subject to state board oversight. NAPCS, on the other hand, acknowledges the state’s 
multiple authorizers but withholds points due to limits placed on those authorizers. The second 
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NAPCS authorizing component directly opposes its CER equivalent. While CER favors 
independence, NAPCS values accountability, leading to a large difference in points on that 
component. Maine is rewarded in the NAPCS system for requiring authorizers to submit annual 
report to the state commissioner of education and for allowing the commissioner to have 
oversight of authorizers through sanctions.  
Although CER scores Maine at only 60 percent on the category of district autonomy, the 
report gives no real explanation for that decision besides saying that autonomy is “limited.”  On 
the other hand, NAPCS gives Maine perfect scores on two of the three district autonomy 
components, and only deducts points on the third component because Maine does not official 
require authorizers to publish annual school performance reports. This reveals a difference in 
emphasis on these categories; NAPCS is less committed to autonomy, but more committed to 
accountability than CER.  
Conclusion: Policy Implications and Limitations 
With the conflicting messages being sent from prominent charter school advocacy 
organizations, state leaders are being pulled in different directions when it comes to how their 
charter laws should be improved going forward. Some charter advocates argue for autonomy 
above all else; this is a very market-centered approach. On the other hand, groups like NAPCS 
tend to be more willing to trade some autonomy for increased accountability. As evidenced by 
the case studies, these different perspectives can lead to very different ideas about which policy 
options are best. In light of this, the question may become: which approach produces better 
outcomes?  
Ideally, policymakers should be able to look across state lines for ideas about what law 
components have been successful and which have not. When it comes to charter school policies, 
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however, there are many barriers to cross-state comparisons. My project attempted to navigate 
some of those barriers by using charter school closings as the measure of success.  
Using school closings frames charter school success from a market perspective. This can 
raise red flags if the closure rate is high or if there are no closings whatsoever. It is possible that 
a state may close no charter schools in a given year because all of their schools are meeting the 
performance and operational requirements while also attracting enough students to remain open. 
For this reason, states should assess if their closure rate of zero indicates a policy success or a 
lack of enforcement of their authorizing and monitoring standards. Further research could 
include a detailed analysis the details of closed schools, including the length of time they were in 
operation and the reason for their closure. If a charter school closes at the time of its first charter 
renewal period or before, it may be argued that that school should not have been authorized in 
the first place.  
 The law components included in my analysis did not have a statistically significant effect 
on a state’s likelihood to close charter schools or its charter school closure rate. Both of my 
included components, the presence of a charter school cap and multiple authorizing types, are 
policy choices for which both prominent organizations advocate. Despite this consensus, these 
components were not found to have an impact on outcomes. As previously discussed, some 
categories of authorizing types did have an effect, even though the overall component did not.  
 Going forward, further research could do a full comparison of scorecard rankings on 
charter school outcomes. One ranking system may better correlate with overall results than the 
other. As further data becomes available on charter school funding, my research could be 
expanded to include more years with a funding control. For now, this analysis indicates that 
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those advocating for charter school caps and multiple authorizing types may be fighting for 
policies that, contrary to previous belief, have no impact on charter school outcomes. 
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Appendix A – 2017 Scorecard Comparisons, Matched and Unique Components 
Matching Components –  
CER  Status NAPCS  
Multiple Authorizers Similar Non-District Authorizers Available 
Authorizer Independence 
of Local/State Authority 
Opposed Authorizer and Overall Program 
Accountability System Required 
No Charter Caps Same No Caps 
Scaling Up Similar  Multischool Charter Contracts and/or 
Multicharter Contract Boards Allowed 
School Autonomy Similar Fiscally and Legally Autonomous Schools 
with Independent Charter Public Schools 
Boards 
Opposed  Performance-Based Charter Contracts 
Required 
Opposed Comprehensive Charter Public School 
Monitoring and Data Collection Processes 
State Allows Freedom to 
Innovate 
Similar Automatic Exemptions from Many State and 
District Laws and Regulations 
Similar A Variety of Charter Public Schools Allowed 
Teacher Freedom Similar Automatic Collective Bargaining Exemption 
Opposed Access to Relevant Employee Retirement 
Systems 
Operating Funds Same Equitable Operational Funding and Equal 
Access to All State and Federal Categorical 
Funding 
Facility Funds/Financing Same Equitable Access to Capital Funding and 
Facilities 
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Unique Components –  
Component Organization 
Pre-K Funds CER Only 
Adequate Authorizer Funding NAPCS Only 
Transparent Charter Application, 
Review, and Decision-making Process 
NAPCS Only 
Clear Processes for Renewal, 
Nonrenewal, and Revocation Decisions 
NAPCS Only 
Transparency Regarding Educational 
Service Providers (ESPs) Allowed 
NAPCS Only 
Clear Student Enrollment and Lottery 
Procedures 
NAPCS Only 
Extracurricular and Interscholastic 
Activities Eligibility and Access 
NAPCS Only 
Clear Provisions Regarding Special 
Education Responsibilities 
NAPCS Only 
Full-Time Virtual Charter School 
Provisions  
NAPCS Only 
 
 
  
 Byers 40 
Appendix B –2012 Scorecard Ranking Comparisons 
 
State CER  NAPCS  Rank Difference 
ME 27 1 26 
NM 22 4 18 
AR 31 17 14 
MA 19 5 14 
NH 33 19 14 
GA 20 14 6 
IL 30 24 6 
RI 32 26 6 
CT 34 29 5 
FL 8 3 5 
NV 25 20 5 
TX 28 23 5 
VA 41 37 4 
HI 38 35 3 
CO 9 7 2 
IA 40 38 2 
OR 23 21 2 
LA 14 13 1 
WY 35 34 1 
KS 39 39 0 
MN 2 2 0 
MS 42 42 0 
OK 26 27 -1 
CA 7 9 -2 
NY 6 8 -2 
UT 10 12 -2 
IN 3 6 -3 
PA 13 16 -3 
AK 36 40 -4 
DE 18 22 -4 
MD 37 41 -4 
NC 29 33 -4 
MI 5 10 -5 
MO 11 18 -7 
NJ 24 31 -7 
SC 17 25 -8 
TN 21 30 -9 
DC 1 11 -10 
AZ 4 15 -11 
OH 15 28 -13 
ID 12 32 -20 
WI 16 36 -20 
 
